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This article provides an up-to-date, comprehensive synthesis and evaluation of the existing litera-
ture on multinational firms and foreign direct investment. Unlike most previous reviews it com-
bines several insights showing their inconsistencies and complementarities. Through a chronolog-
ical description it presents the main strands since the earliest perfect competition studies from the
1960s till some new recent contributions such as the knowledge-capital model, heterogeneous firms
models, and internalisation issues. The paper also offers a new perspective, by reviewing the avail-
able computable general equilibrium models that include multinationals and foreign direct invest-
ment.
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1. Introduction
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are nowadays the focus of much attention as they are
central players in the world economy. However, their analysis constitutes a young discipline.
Most studies begun in the 1960s, a period in which foreign direct investment (FDI) was ex-
periencing an enormous growth, which attracted economists’ attention. This was not, how-
ever, the first moment in which FDI had grown dramatically. Baldwin and Martin (1999) de-
scribe two waves of globalisation which are related to a rise in FDI flows, among other
aspects. The first wave had taken place in the period 1820-1914, and was characterised by
Hacienda Pública Española / Revista de Economía Pública, 191-(4/2009): 97-126
© 2009, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
∗ Acknowledgements: The author thanks Oscar Bajo-Rubio for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts,
and acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, through the project
ECO2008-05072-C02-01. The usual disclaimer applies.North to South FDI in primary product sectors and railroads. The second wage initialised in
the 1960s and still continues nowadays, involving FDI mainly among developed nations
with a focus on manufacturing, services and outsourcing. What caused such remarkable
growth of FDI in the past? What is causing it nowadays? Which are its consequences?
Since the 1960s, the study of MNEs and FDI has been a fertile research topic. A num-
ber of authors have devoted their efforts to review the literature; see Agarwal (1980), Gra-
ham (1992), Markusen (1995), Blomström and Kokko (1997), Lipsey (2002), Barba
Navaretti and Venables (2004), Feenstra (2004), Helpman (2006), Caves (2007), Greenaway
and Kneller (2007) and Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), to name a few. This article of-
fers a concise but comprehensive review and evaluation of the existing literature on MNEs
and FDI since its beginnings, with two main targets in mind. First, we offer an up-to-date,
comprehensive synthesis and evaluation of the main theoretical strands. In particular,
through a chronological description, we show that some of the earlier studies provided en-
lightening ideas, which are now being developed through more formal and sophisticated
analyses, such as Markusen’s (2002) “knowledge-capital model”, or the recent studies on
heterogeneous firms and internalisation issues. Unlike previous studies, we do not focus on
a particular strand of the literature but combine several theoretical insights (i.e., contractual
and technological theories), which proves useful to grasp their disagreements and comple-
mentarities.
Second, we offer a new perspective for the analysis of the effects of MNEs. These ef-
fects have been very much debated indeed, and there is still some controversy regarding their
impact on host economies, as can be seen in the active antiglobalisation movements. Instead
of offering a common review on econometric and descriptive studies, we focus on new de-
velopments following the use of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, which have
recently included the activities of MNEs. Econometric and descriptive analyses have provided
fruitful results but they offer dispersed contributions and different strands according to the
particular effect analysed. Thus, there is literature on their impact on wages, a different lit-
erature on their effects on foreign trade, another one on productivity, on market structure,
and so on. Can we see which economic forces prevail among the several simultaneous ones
that MNEs unleash in a host economy? Facing such a fragmented literature, it seems diffi-
cult to obtain an economy-wide evaluation of their impact. This is why we look at a less
known and nascent empirical line of research which seems suitable for this type of analyses,
namely, CGE models, which convey a novelty in the available surveys on MNEs and FDI.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 successively review the perfect competition
approaches from the 1960s, which treated FDI as a mere capital movement (section 2.1); the
imperfect competition approaches from the 1970s, in which some aspects of MNEs were
added to FDI modeling (section 2.2); the imperfect competition approaches that appeared
from the 1980s onwards, which differentiate between vertical and horizontal MNEs, includ-
ing the “knowledge capital model” (section 2.3); the heterogeneous firms models in the
2000s (section 2.4); and finishes with some recent contributions on internalisation issues
(section 2.5). Section 3 goes on with the reviews of CGE models, beginning with a brief dis-
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available models that include MNEs (section 3.2). Finally, some concluding remarks are pre-
sented in section 4.
2. Multinational firms and foreign direct investment:
Main theoretical strands (1960s-1970s-1980s-2000s…)
2.1. Perfect competition approaches (1960s): Foreign direct investment
as a capital movement
The first formalisations of FDI tended to model it as capital (i.e., a production factor)
moving across countries. This idea was a logical extension of the traditional theory of invest-
ment responding to differences in the expected rates of return on capital. This view, there-
fore, predicted that FDI would go from capital abundant countries (where its return was low)
to capital scarce countries (where its return was high). Two early theoretical contributions in
this line are Mundell (1957) and MacDougall (1960).
Mundell (1957) analysed the effects of factor movements in a 2-sector, 2-countries and
2-factors (2×2×2) Heckscher-Ohlin model. Under this framework, unless factor endowments
differences between the two countries are extreme, so that the factor price equalisation the-
orem does not hold, product and factor prices remain unchanged after a capital inflow. On
the contrary, with extreme factor endowments differences, countries would specialise in the
production of the good which is a relatively heavy user of the more abundant and, therefore,
cheaper factor of production in each country, thus, excluding factor price equalisation. An-
other outcome stemming from his model is that the capital inflow reduces imports, i.e., trade
and capital movements are found to be substitutes. This is why his contribution has been
summarised in the idea that “trade in factors is a substitute for trade in goods”.
The suggestion that capital flows do not have any effect on factor prices, obtained in a
Heckscher-Ohlin model, is a rather surprising result. In fact, adding the assumption of spe-
cific factors to a simple (2×2×2) Heckscher-Ohlin model considerably changes the out-
comes, as capital inflows do affect factor rewards and give rise to cross-hauled FDI flows,
i.e., there will be two-way flows between pairs of countries (Jones, 1971; Neary, 1978;
Caves, 2007). This is a nice characteristic which matches the empirical evidence of most de-
veloped countries simultaneously sending and receiving FDI inflows.
Rather than analysing factor movements, as in Mundell (1957), MacDougall (1960) fo-
cuses on the simplest case of a capital inflow into a one-sector economy. FDI inflows in this
setting lower the capital rent in the receiving economy, but also increase labour productivity.
The latter effect predominates, increasing welfare for the receiving economy.
Some findings from the models above, such as two-way flows of direct investment, or
the potential substitution between trade and FDI are genuine intuitions. However, this theory
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in (and is directed to) developed economies, which should be capital abundant (Barba
Navaretti and Venables, 2004, chapter 1; Markusen, 2002; UNCTAD, several years). In fact,
the share of developing economies in world gross FDI flows has usually been around 20-25
percent since the 1970s onwards (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004, chapter 1). Further-
more, only a small number of developing economies receive these FDI inflows in the last
years, e.g., China accounts for nearly one-quarter of the total, and a few economies in Asia
and Latin America account for the rest, whereas flows going to Africa are nearly negligible
(Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004, chapter 1; UNCTAD, several years). This means that
capital does not go to high return locations, i.e., developing countries with low capital en-
dowments. Nevertheless, data problems may lead to defend that this theory still holds be-
cause it was tested using inappropriate variables. On the one hand, there are many problems
to calculate the correct rate of return. Empirical analysis usually relies on profits calculated
from an accounting point of view which differ from those derived from economic criteria.
This is so because MNEs use transfer prices for transactions between the parent and sub-
sidiaries to make profits arise in countries with the most favourable tax environment, among
other reasons. On the other hand, Yeaple (2003a) maintains that aggregation biases might be
behind the empirical outcome that FDI is not related to differences in capital endowments
(and, consequently, on the rate of return of capital) across countries.
In the 1960s and 1970s some economists worked on the empirical relationship between
FDI, the rate of return and risk (Agarwal, 1980). The so called portfolio theory predicts a
positive relation of FDI with respect to the rate of return and a negative one with respect to
risk. Portfolio diversification may help to reduce the total risk involved, i.e., a firm can re-
duce risks by undertaking projects in more than one country. However, the portfolio theory
is an extension of a vision of FDI as capital movements. In this sense, it is still incomplete.
We see clearly nowadays, that the essence of FDI is that is related to a particular type of
firms’ production abroad. Each firm has a unique bundle of factors, competencies and pro-
cedures which get transferred to foreign operations when FDI occurs. Therefore, FDI is best
thought of as movements of firms, rather than simple movements of capital (Graham, 1992;
Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004, chapter 11). This idea had appeared earlier. Indeed,
some authors abandoned the emphasis on FDI as capital movements and turn their attention
to the MNE.
2.2. Imperfect competition approaches (1970s): Adding some aspects of multinationals
The theories discussed above are based on the assumption of perfect competition in do-
mestic factor and/or product markets. They belong to the traditional trade theory that has
dominated for decades, based on competitive, constant-returns models. Hymer’s (1976)
work showed that the idea of FDI as a simple capital movement responding to rates of re-
turn (with or without risk) did not match the real characteristics of MNEs’ activities. His pi-
oneering analysis was in his PhD Dissertation, which dates back to 1960, but was published
much later, in 1976. The consequences of his contribution were and still are very important.
100 MARÍA C. LATORRE MUÑOZHe drew attention to the MNE, in particular, to the type of assets the MNE owned and to the
difficulty of transferring those assets -due to market imperfections-. Two main types of mar-
ket imperfections are relevant. One arises from MNEs’ advantages with respect to firms with
no foreign operations (the differentiation between firm types -MNEs versus domestic- vio-
lates the assumptions of perfect competition); and the other is due to transaction costs. Let
us briefly review both in turn.
First, MNEs have some advantages compared to local firms. When establishing plants
in a foreign country MNEs have some disadvantages compared with local firms (e.g., igno-
rance of customers’ preferences, legal system, institutional framework and the cost of oper-
ating away from the parent company). If, despite these disadvantages, MNEs decide to es-
tablish plants abroad, they must possess some advantages to which existing or potential local
competitors have no access and that more than compensate the disadvantages. Second, the
concept of transaction costs. Transaction costs arise from the difficulties of using the market
to organise transactions (e.g., it is hard to design a contract between the firm and its suppli-
ers that contemplates all the circumstances that may arise in the future), therefore the firms’
internal procedures are better suited than markets to organise transactions. This point will be
further developed later on.
A different approach to FDI is the product-cycle theory (Vernon, 1966). This theory
gave useful explanations for the expansion of US MNEs after World War II. It explains FDI
as a reaction to the threat of losing markets as a product matures, and as a search of cheaper
factor costs to face competition. Its essence is that most products follow a similar life
cycle. In a first stage, the product appears as an innovation which is sold locally in the same
country where it is produced (the US). This is so in order to facilitate satisfying local de-
mand while having an efficient coordination between research, development and produc-
tion units. In a second stage, the product begins to be exported (to Western Europe). In a
third stage, some competitors arise in Europe. If conditions are favourable the firm will es-
tablish foreign subsidiaries there to face the increased competition and it may also establish
subsidiaries in less developed countries to have access to cheaper labour costs to enhance
its competitiveness.
Hirsch (1976) worked on the circumstances which influence a firm’s decision on
whether using exports or FDI to serve the foreign market. His model takes into account the
costs of managing production abroad as well as the asset specificity of the capital owned by
MNEs in a simple but complete framework. Other studies, this time empirically oriented,
worked on the effects of tariffs on FDI and on the predominance of MNEs in industries char-
acterised by differentiated output and more highly educated employees. Thus, we find some
authors that were already using modern approaches to FDI, anticipating those of the 1980s.
Before moving on to that period, though, we have to devote some attention to the important
work of Dunning.
The analysis of Hymer (1976) was given an important step forward by Dunning’s work
(1977, 1979, 2000). Dunning put together already existing elements in a coherent and uni-
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These three conditions constitute the basis of the eclectic or OLI paradigm, where OLI
stands for “ownership, location, internalisation”. Ownership means the sort of advantages
that MNEs should have, in the same line pointed out in Hymer’s contribution. Location gives
the idea that for a MNE to establish a new plant in a foreign country, this country must have
some advantages compared to the home country of the MNE. These advantages may be
cheaper factors of production, better access to natural resources, a bigger market, and so on.
Finally, the internalisation idea had also been noted by Hymer when he dealt with transac-
tion costs. It may be more beneficial for a firm to exploit its ownership advantages within its
subsidiaries than to sell or license them to other independent firms.
The central concepts of the OLI paradigm have been also introduced in a dynamic
framework known as the Investment Development Path. This concept relates the inward
and outward direct investment position of countries with their corresponding stages of
development (Dunning, 1981; Dunning and Narula, 1996). It suggests that countries tend
to go through five main stages of development. Each of the stages links the GNP level
with the net outward investment position, i.e., the difference between outward and inward
FDI stocks.
2.3. Imperfect competition since the 1980s: Vertical versus horizontal multinationals
We have already alluded to the emergence of the importance of some aspects related to
the firm in the framework of the analysis of FDI. This had also been the case in trade theo-
ries. Indeed, trade theories had begun to incorporate important elements of the industrial or-
ganisation literature, such as imperfect competition, economies of scale and product differ-
entiation starting at Krugman (1979, 1980) and Helpman (1981). Clearly, this new approach,
which is sometimes called “new trade theory”, was a considerable improvement in trade
models; reviews of this literature can be found in Bajo-Rubio (1991) and Krugman (1995).
Triggered by the empirical observation of intra-industry trade (i.e. trade within the MNEs,
either between the parent and the subsidiary or between affiliates), it delivered theoretical
models able to resemble this form of trade. What is more, it further provided a framework in
which MNEs could better integrate into the trade theory. Imperfect competition, economies
of scale and differentiated products are more in accordance with Hymer’s enlightening ideas
regarding the nature of the MNE.
A new literature on MNEs has risen from this perspective. It is an approach that deals
primarily with the incentives, or determinants, for FDI to arise. Taking a microeconomic per-
spective, the theory relies on location and ownership determinants, according to Dunning’s
terminology. Location advantages are related to the host country (factor prices, factor en-
dowments, and distance measured as transport costs). Ownership advantages are captured
from technological aspects of the firm, such as economies of scale, R&D efforts and trans-
port costs. In what follows we will highlight some remarkable contributions stemming from
this line of research.
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whereas others do the same on the vertical side of the phenomenon. Vertical MNEs are those
which geographically separate each stage of the production process according to relative cost
advantages. They, therefore, look for low-cost inputs and supply their output to other sub-
sidiaries of the MNE through intrafirm exports. The link between vertical MNEs and intrafirm
trade should not be overlooked, particularly because intrafirm trade, in turn, accounts for a rel-
evant and increasingly growing part of international trade (Hanson et al., 2005). Horizontal
MNEs are those producing roughly the same product in different locations in order to gain an
easier access to the host market, i.e. they are mainly interested in sales in the foreign country.
Let us begin with the studies on vertical MNEs. They deal primarily with the following
question: why do firms sometimes break the production process across borders rather than
keeping all stages in the home country? A pioneering model was that of Helpman (1984). He
extended a 2×2×2 Heckscher-Ohlin model to include MNEs with monopolistic competition
and differentiated products. In his model the incentive for vertical MNEs to arise stems from
factor price differences across countries. Helpman showed that by splitting production
processes with different input requirements MNEs can exploit cross-country differences in
factor prices by shifting activities to the cheapest locations. In the presence of factor price
differences across countries, firms have an incentive to geographically separate capital-in-
tensive production of intangible assets (headquarters services, for example) from the more
labour-intensive production of goods.
Therefore, the sort of MNEs described by Helpman, the vertical MNEs, tends to be more
prevalent when there are differences in relative factor endowments among countries. Fur-
thermore, in the case of vertical MNEs, FDI and trade are complements: “the larger the dif-
ference in relative factor endowments the larger is the volume of trade” (Helpman, 1984, p.
467). In addition, the introduction of MNEs increases the possibilities of FDI leading to the
elimination of international factor price differences.
Zhang and Markusen (1999) offer a (2×2×2) model of vertical MNEs in a Cournot oli-
gopoly incorporating transport costs that were absent in Helpman (1984). Their model pre-
dicts a positive relationship between the size of the host country and the number of vertical
multinationals. There is a minimum threshold size below which no FDI takes place. The rea-
son for this lies in transport costs and economies of scale. All production that cannot be sold
in the host country market will have to be shipped back to the parent’s country, which en-
tails paying for transport costs. If trade costs and economies of scale are low then the host
country size is not so important, though. The model also suggests the need for a minimum
threshold of skilled labour in the host country where fragmentation takes place. Below that
minimum FDI is discouraged. Furthermore, when MNEs arise, their more skilled-labour in-
tensive technologies lead to a more skilled labour-intensive production in both countries.
This pushes up the real wage of this factor of production in both countries.
What about the horizontal approach? This is concerned with the question: why do firms
decide to serve foreign markets through FDI rather than simply exporting? This is not a re-
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swer. Markusen (1984) includes the analysis of this decision in a general equilibrium trade
model with imperfect competition. Brainard’s (1993, 1997) work is also an outstanding con-
tribution. Her main findings are that firms choose horizontal FDI versus exporting when the
gains from avoiding trade costs outweigh the costs of maintaining productive capacity in
multiple markets, i.e. the so called proximity-concentration trade off. More technically, hor-
izontal MNEs are more likely to arise when: 1) firm-level scale economies of scale are high,
2) plant-level scale economies of scale are low, and 3) trade costs are high. She tested her
predictions empirically obtaining robust support for them.
Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000) offer two models of MNEs that also support the
predictions of Brainard’s analysis. Their novelty lies in their well-grounded outcome regard-
ing two other determinants of the emergence of horizontal MNEs (and the corresponding im-
pact on the pattern of trade and factor prices): countries’ size and factor endowments. Hori-
zontal FDI flows are increasing in countries similarities in size, as measured by GDP, and
factor endowments; i.e., the more similar in GDP and factor endowments two countries are,
the more FDI will take place between them. The logic is simple. When countries are very
different, MNEs derive their disadvantage from having to locate costly additional “capacity”
in a “disadvantaged” country (i.e., the one in which sales are smaller, factor costs are
higher, and/or factor productivity is smaller). MNEs, therefore, cannot compete against sin-
gle-plant national firms settled in an “advantaged” country, which serve the “disadvantaged”
countries by exports. Note this outcome is just the opposite to that offered by models of ver-
tical MNEs. Furthermore, these two models deliver a strong prediction regarding the rela-
tionship between trade and horizontal MNEs. When countries have a similar size and factor
endowments, trade tends to go down and MNEs tend to increase, as horizontal MNEs com-
pete and displace national firms and trade. Thus, trade and horizontal FDI are substitutes,
again the opposite relationship compared to that predicted by vertical MNEs models.
Another important contribution is Markusen’s “knowledge-capital model”, developed in
Markusen (1997; 2002, chapters 7 and 8). This is a 2-country, 2-factor, 2-good model in
which both vertical and horizontal MNEs are included simultaneously. This means a step
forward in MNEs’ modeling, which is of particular relevance given the empirical importance
of both types of flows (Helpman, 2006). Markusen is, further, one of the few authors, to the
best of our knowledge, that offers a detailed study regarding the welfare effects of MNEs to
which we turn now1.
Markusen maintains that MNEs may benefit both countries in his model. However, it
is the larger one that loses if indeed one country loses. This is the country in which MNEs’
headquarters are, so he concludes that in contrast to some conventional arguments, it is gen-
erally the host economies that are ensured of gains and the parent countries that could lose
from investment liberalisation. Markusen also looks at the effects on a host economy of
trade liberalisation, investment liberalisation, and simultaneous investment and trade liber-
alisation. This perspective allows him to show that the host economies’ welfare is highest
under full liberalisation (investment and trade liberalisation). He notes that the “knowledge-
104 MARÍA C. LATORRE MUÑOZcapital model” resembles a “pro-skilled labour bias”, which is an important factor in making
results go against the logic of traditional theory. The “pro-skilled labour bias” means
that the effects of MNEs’ emergence are analogous to a change to a more skilled-labour in-
tensive technology in the world in general. In other words, MNEs make both countries spe-
cialise in more labour-skilled technologies than before MNEs’ arrivals. An important con-
sequence can be drawn from the skilled labour bias. If a factor of production loses from
MNEs’ emergence it will be unskilled labour. This finding is consistent with the results of
Zhang and Markusen (1999).
Using data for inward and outward U.S. affiliate sales, Carr et al. (2001) obtain support
for Markusen’s “knowledge capital model” which, as noted above, considers the simultane-
ous presence of vertical and horizontal MNEs. However, with respect to their results, Bloni-
gen et al. (2003) argue that there is some misspecification in the proxy for skill-labour dif-
ferences that, when corrected, leads to econometric results that support the horizontal MNEs
model. This would give less importance to the weight of vertical US MNEs. Nonetheless, in
their reply, Carr et al. (2003) explain some flaws existing in the approach of Blonigen et al.
(2003), such as the use of FDI stocks rather than MNE’s data, which are the focus of the the-
ory developed by Markusen.
Within this framework of location and ownership advantages, a line of research incor-
porates R&D decisions into theoretical models of the MNE. MNEs are generally charac-
terised by a strong effort in R&D activities. However, the intangible nature of many of these
assets makes it difficult to incorporate them into theoretical (and empirical) models. An in-
teresting answer to this is offered by Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers (2003, 2007). Their
theoretical model analyses the costs and benefits of undertaking R&D activities in a sub-
sidiary of the MNE versus keeping those activities within the headquarters. The empirical
evidence on this shows that R&D activities are mostly done in the headquarters, however we
also have evidence that subsidiaries are increasing the scope of this sort of activities (Sanna-
Randaccio and Veugelers, 2003). The authors obtain two important conclusions. First, the
more technologically advanced the host economy is, the more likely it will benefit from the
presence of foreign subsidiaries performing R&D activities. Second, the potential harmful
effects of MNEs are likely to diminish if they are not direct competitors in the same market
of the local firm. In other words, vertical (or inter-industry) relationships between foreign
and local firms (i.e., backward and forward linkages) are more beneficial than horizontal (or
intra-industry) ones.
2.4. Firm heterogeneity models in the 2000s
As noted above, in the 1980s, the “new trade models” had introduced monopolistic com-
petition and product differentiation. In so doing, they resembled a sort of within-industry
heterogeneity, because each firm produced a different variety of a good. Further, a new
source of welfare gains arose from the presence of economies of scale and several varieties,
since foreign trade could make more varieties available for consumers. However, in these
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ticipation in trade2. What is more, these models predicted that all firms would export. Em-
pirical data are at odds with this sort of symmetry assumptions. Throughout the 1990s bet-
ter firm-level data made clearer that only a small fraction of firms within an industry export,
and that exporters are larger and more productive than non-exporters. The evidence support-
ing that the causality runs from higher productivity to exports and not vice versa (Bernard et
al., 2007a; Greenaway and Kneller, 2007).
Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003) offer two pioneering trade models of exporting
versus non-exporting firms, which resemble these features of the data. The former has been
particularly influential and transmits the idea that more dispersion in productivity raises the
share of exporting firms in domestic output. Both models, though, include fixed costs of ex-
porting and productivity differences across firms within the same industry, which were ab-
sent in most models of the “new trade” literature and are key ingredients for the results. This
“firm heterogeneity models” predict that trade liberalisation or a fall in transportation costs
lead to higher average industry productivity, because the more productive firms survive and
grow, whereas the lower-productivity non-exporting firms may more easily contract produc-
tion or exit. Thus, in this type of models, within-industry reallocation of activity is possible.
The old theoretical models predicted that trade costs could raise welfare through specialisa-
tion across industries and countries according to comparative advantage. An additional
source of welfare emerges now because trade increases output and employment in high-pro-
ductivity exporting firms within an industry, which is a force pulling up average productiv-
ity. This latter welfare gain seems to be more sizeable than across-industry reallocations
(Bernard et al., 2007a)3.
Helpman et al. (2004) extend Melitz’s (2003) model to include MNEs, analysing the de-
cision to open a subsidiary abroad. Their model is consistent with the above noted conclu-
sions of the models of Brainard and Markusen and Venables on horizontal FDI, which is the
type of MNEs that all these models consider. However, the addition of intra-industry firm
heterogeneity leads these authors to derive that the sales of foreign affiliates relative to ex-
ports are larger in sectors with more firm heterogeneity in productivity, the latter being prox-
ied by firms’ sales or size. Furthermore, they obtain strong support for this result in a cross-
section of industries using a regression analogous to that in Brainard (1997). Heterogeneity,
therefore, arises as an important factor to explain not only trade patterns but also MNEs’ be-
haviour. In their model, exporting involves lower fixed costs than FDI activities, while FDI
involves lower variable costs than exporting. MNEs are the most productive firms, followed
by exporters which are, in turn, more productive than firms serving only the domestic mar-
ket. The marginal cost varies across firms generating heterogeneity in productivity, whereas
fixed costs are fixed across firms’ types, as in Melitz (2003). This assumption is also con-
firmed by their empirical evidence.
The relationship between firm efficiency and three modes of foreign market access,
namely, exports, greenfield investments, and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is analysed
by Nocke and Yeaple (2007). Note that the distinction between two FDI types (greenfield
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where the source of firm heterogeneity is due to the internationally mobile factors (such as
R&D intensive technologies), firms involved in both M&A and greenfield FDI investments
are more efficient than exporters. By contrast, in industries where the source of firm hetero-
geneity is not internationally mobile (such as firm marketing expertise), firms undertaking
greenfield FDI are more efficient than exporters but those engaging in cross-border M&A
are less efficient than exporters; this latter result would contradict the prediction of Helpman
et al. (2004). Accordingly, “the common procedure of pooling industries in regression analy-
sis is inappropriate as the mapping from firm characteristics to mode choices differs quali-
tatively across industries” (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007, p. 378).
Grossman et al. (2006) provide a model in which MNEs may undertake complex
strategies in which horizontal and vertical FDI are simultaneous. Note that, contrary to
Markusen’s (2002) “knowledge capital model”, this does not mean vertical and horizontal
MNEs interacting, but that the same firm can undertake both vertical and horizontal (i.e.,
complex) strategies simultaneously. Grossman et al. (2006) follow Yeaple’s (2003b)
model of complex strategies and are also inspired by Ekholm et al. (2007) model of export
platform FDI. Indeed, they extend Yeaple’s (2003b) framework by including heteroge-
neous firms following Melitz (2003). Their outcomes are in accordance with the produc-
tivity sorting of Helpman et al. (2004), with MNEs, exporting and domestic firms exhibit-
ing decreasing levels of productivities, respectively. Their model suggest that not only
cross-country differences in costs are important for the complex strategies of MNEs to
arise, as in Yeaple (2003b) and Ekholm et al. (2007), but that within industry firm hetero-
geneity, which is absent in the latter, plays an important role in determining the different
strategies of MNEs. In fact, the introduction of firm heterogeneity allows Grossman et al.
(2006) to abandon Yeaple’s (2003) sort of “symmetric producers” outcome, by which all
MNEs within an industry end up developing the same type of complex strategy, which is
at odds with the empirical evidence. Through heterogeneity Grossman et al. (2006) also
depart from the determinism in Ekholm et al. (2007), which establishes that intermediate
goods, which may be assembled in any county, must always be produced where the head-
quarters are. Aw and Lee (2008) follow Grossman et al. (2006), but instead of analysing
complex strategies between two rich countries in the North and one in the South, they con-
struct a 3-country model in which heterogeneous firms of a middle-income country choose
between exporting or sending MNEs to a high-income or a low-income country. Using
data from Taiwanese electronics firms they also find that the firms sending FDI are more
productive than the ones that export. Their original contribution is that MNEs which in-
vest only in the rich country (US) are more productive than those investing only in the
poor country (China), which seems due to the higher fixed costs of investment in the rich
country compared to those in the poor one.
These latter “3-country models” on “complex strategies” are of particular interest, at
least for two important reasons. First, because they deal with the role of “origin and destina-
tion” of trade and FDI. This point may be quite influential for results and is frequently over-
looked in theoretical and empirical analyses. Second, because they consider the possibility
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can explain what seems to constitute the main part of trade, i.e. the extensive-margin, which
is explained by both the number of destinations and the number of exported products
(Bernard et al., 2007a).
Heterogeneity has brought trade and FDI models closer to reality by capturing the fact
that within-industries different types of firms coexist (non-exporters, exporters, and differ-
ent types of MNEs), which has led to abandon the “representative firm” assumption. Within-
industry adjustments and new sources of welfare and growth have been identified. There
seem to be still some challenges ahead, however. In particular, it seems that “heterogeneous
firms” models are not so good at grasping the differences between vertical and horizontal
differentiation in goods, while there is empirical evidence that prices within the product cat-
egories traded “vary substantially and systematically across countries” (Bernard et al.,
2007a). Furthermore, to come closer and closer to reality, the already identified within-in-
dustry adjustments need to take a step further and consider the adjustments “within the firm”
(Grossman et al., 2006). We turn to this point in the next section, which belongs to an area
often called “contractual theories” of the multinational firm.
2.5. Recent contributions on internalisation issues
The issue of internalisation, which is the center of the “contractual theories” of the
MNE, covers a gap present in those theories more oriented to location and ownership advan-
tages, i.e., the so called “technological theories”, reviewed in sections 2.3 and 2.44. The lat-
ter give an idea of the incentives to produce abroad but do not explain why foreign produc-
tion of a MNE will occur within the firm’s boundaries (i.e., within the MNE), rather than
through arm’s-length subcontracting (i.e., contracts with independent firms, a phenomenon
known as foreign outsourcing)5. Furthermore, the interest on this subject goes beyond the
area of firms’ internal organisation. Why? Trade statistics seem to exhibit systematic pat-
terns related with internalisation (i.e., the decision of foreign insourcing versus foreign out-
sourcing seems related with some firm, industry and country characteristics) and the reallo-
cation of economics activities that these processes bring about may well impact
macroeconomic aggregates (Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). We showed in section 2.2
how internalisation issues were central in the analyses of Hymer and Dunning. However,
there is a recent literature which has formalised internalisation including it in the framework
of newer trade theories. We offer in the next paragraphs a brief overview of this literature.
Analysing internalisation decisions leads us to a world where the classical assumption
of complete contracting is not possible. Let us explain this briefly. When choosing between
arm’s-length subcontracting versus internalising, the MNE, as well as a national firm, faces
a trade-off. On the one hand, if the firm decides to internalise its foreign operations it will
have to pay the higher costs involved in setting up and running a wholly owned plant in a
foreign country; on the other hand, if the firm decides to outsource it will have to face some
market failures affecting contractual relationships with local firms. Local firms tend to have
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firms would decide to outsource activities to local suppliers in order to benefit from their ex-
perience. However, there are market failures arising from the difficulty of coordinating and
controlling the actions of local firms through contracts. In most cases, the firm that out-
sources has to pay a high rent to local firms to ensure that the process “will work”. This re-
sults in a reduction of the profits accruing to the firm that outsources, incentivating internal-
isation. How has this trade-off been formalised in the literature?
An issue frequently studied is the so called hold-up problem, which has two compo-
nents. One is the difficulty of writing contracts covering all possible contingencies in the re-
lationship between a firm and its external supplier. The other one is that the local supplier
has to do some specific investments to produce the components demanded by the firm it
serves, or from a different angle, that the goods he will produce for its customer are very spe-
cific, which makes it difficult to sell them to other customers. The local supplier knows that
the contract will be incomplete, as well as the specificity of its production. He may fear that
after having invested to produce the input for the firm, the contract then should have to be
renegotiated as long as some contingencies uncovered have occurred. As the investments
made by the local supplier are specific to that relationship he will be in a weak bargaining
position. Under these circumstances, local suppliers are likely to underinvest, compared to
what they would do if we were in a world of complete contracting. This inefficiency of sub-
optimal investment reduces the total return to outsourcing.
Ethier (1986) was the first one to analyse the hold-up problem in a context of MNEs’
activities within a general equilibrium framework. According to his model, internalisation is
more likely when the affiliates are in countries with small factor endowments differences.
Note that this result contradicts the outcome of Helpman’s (1984) model on vertical MNEs.
This suggests that internalisation decisions may change the panorama offered by FDI mod-
els of technological theories. Incomplete contracts also arise from the difficulty of protect-
ing intangible assets. Ethier and Markusen (1996) first formalised the case of transferring an
intangible asset with superior knowledge embodied. In their model firms may choose among
exporting, opening a subsidiary, or licensing their technology to an independent firm. If the
knowledge is transferred to the licensee, the latter may set up its own plant and start com-
peting with the original owner of the knowledge. To avoid this, the firm needs to design an
optimal licensing contract. In this case, the contract should promise important rents to the
local supplier to make defection unprofitable. But these high rents may be too costly to the
firm, again incentivating internalisation. Their findings again suggest that similarities in rel-
ative factor endowments favour FDI over licensing, as in Ethier (1986).
In the two previous models, as happens in much of the literature on the theory of the firm,
the choice of the firm to integrate seems independent of the decisions of other firms within
the same industry. McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002) develop models con-
sidering the decision of firms to integrate suppliers, in which those decisions affect market
conditions, thereby influencing other firms’ decisions. Both models transmit the idea that ver-
tical integration may be negative for the remaining non-integrated bilateral relationships, by
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an expansion of the market for inputs and thus favours firms’ outsourcing over FDI.
So far, the models have neglected the costs of internalisation. They belong to the “trans-
action-cost approach” which considers the contractual problems among firms that are not in-
tegrated, but does not take into account the costs of intrafirm transactions (Antràs and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008). A more comprehensive approximation is the “property-rights approach” to
internalisation, which includes both types of contractual frictions and is derived from the
seminal paper of Grossman and Hart (1986). We review now some influential papers along
this latter perspective.
Antràs (2003) has shown that R&D or capital intensity measures are the main determi-
nants of the considerable variation of intrafirm trade across industries. He uses a general
equilibrium model of international trade with monopolistic competition, increasing returns
and product differentiation combined with insights from the property-rights approach. Sim-
ple R&D and capital intensity measures account for almost 75% of the cross-industry varia-
tion in the weight of intrafirm imports in total US imports. This implies that more complex
goods (which are capital-intensive or research-intensive, e.g., chemicals) are more likely to
be produced under vertical integration, thus, bringing about intrafirm trade. By contrast, sim-
pler goods (labour-intensive, e.g., textiles) tend to be bought under contract, through out-
sourcing and, thus, involve arm’s length trade. He derives a parallel result for countries. The
share of intrafirm imports in total U.S. imports is larger the higher the capital-labour ratio of
the exporting country (i.e., exports coming from capital-abundant countries, such as Switzer-
land, tend to take place between affiliated units of MNEs, whereas exports of capital-scarce
countries, such as Egypt, occur mostly at arm’s length). In a cross-section of countries he ob-
tains robust support for the impact of capital abundance.
In brief, Antrás (2003) suggests that capital intensity (both at the country and indus-
try level) is positively associated with internalisation. This is of particular interest, be-
cause his model does not consider the presence of important determinants of FDI, accord-
ing to the technological approach to MNEs, such as, factor price differences across
countries, nor a distinction between firm specific and plant specific economies of scale
neither transport costs. Remember that factor price differences were the key for the emer-
gence of vertical MNEs in Helpman (1984). Moreover, the rest of characteristics consti-
tuted the ingredients of Brainard’s proximity-concentration trade off, which was also
supported and expanded by Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000) and Markusen (2002),
whose work also derived the importance of similarities in countries’ sizes and factor en-
dowments to explain horizontal FDI. Therefore, the importance of Antràs’ (2003) theo-
retical model and its econometric robustness is that, without those “technological” char-
acteristics, it gives new reasons for the prevalence of FDI among rich countries (versus
FDI flows going from rich countries to poor ones). Furthermore, it describes an intrafirm
trade pattern which matches the empirical evidence that “the well-known predominance
of North-North trade in total trade is even more pronounced within the intrafirm compo-
nent of trade” (Antràs, 2003, p. 1376).
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(2003). The model has two countries, North and South. Final-good producers are based in
the North, where they produce an input necessary for production called “headquarter services”.
Intermediate-input producers can be either in the North or in the South, variable costs
being lower in the latter. Like in Antràs (2003), the relative intensity in the use of these two
inputs (now termed differently, establishing “heaquarter” versus “component” intensive
technologies) will be an important determinant of the choice between (home versus foreign)
integration and outsourcing6.
However, the prevalence of the different organizational forms depends in Antrás and
Helpman (2004) on a wider range of characteristics than the above commented in Antràs
(2003). These are: the wage gap between the North and the South, the trading costs of in-
termediate inputs and the degree of productivity dispersion within a sector. Other two key
determinants, which were already present in Antràs (2003), are the distribution of the bar-
gaining power between the final-good producers and supplier of components7 and the
“headquarter intensity” of the technology (the latter being what Antràs (2003) identified as
“capital intensity”). From the interaction of all these characteristics, four organizational
forms are possible within an industry: integrating abroad, outsourcing abroad, integrating
at home, outsourcing at home, where integrating abroad has the highest level of fixed costs
and this sorting reveals their corresponding decreasing level of fixed costs, respectively.
Even for alternative sortings of fixed costs, which they also study, the model still keeps the
flavour of Antràs (2003) in predicting the prevalence of FDI in relative headquarter inten-
sive sectors, whereas outsourcing dominates in those with lower headquarter intensity (i.e.,
components-intensive).
The presence of heterogeneity now leads Antrás and Helpman (2004) to derive, that the
share of intrafirm imports of components in total imports is higher in industries with higher
productivity dispersion. As vertical integration abroad involves larger fixed costs than out-
sourcing abroad, the most productive firms, among those which are “headquarter” (or capi-
tal) intensive, will be in a better position to undertake vertical FDI. By contrast, both the
widening of wage gap between the North and the South and a reduction of the trading costs
of intermediate inputs, result in a reduction of the costs of foreign sourcing, which raises
arm’s-length trade rises relative to intrafirm trade8. These tendencies for a wider wage gap
and lower trade costs seem to prevail and, as commented by the authors, are in accordance
with the still scarce empirical evidence suggesting that the growth of foreign outsourcing
might have outpaced the growth of foreign intrafirm sourcing in the US and, generally, in
world trade flows.
Antràs (2005) uses a dynamic general equilibrium model that provides a theory for
Vernon’s product-cycle (1966) original one. He shows that firms from the rich North
may find it profit maximising to shift production to the low-wage South after a time lag,
due to incomplete contracts. More recently, Antràs and Helpman (2008) have extended
the setting of Antràs and Helpman (2004) to include varying degrees of contractual fric-
tions across both inputs and countries. The main question analysed in this paper is: How
111 The economic analysis of multinationals and foreign direct investment: A reviewdo improvements in contractibility affect the relative prevalence of the four possible or-
ganisational forms? In their model, an improvement in South’s contracting institutions
(logically) increases offshoring, but whether the expansion of offshoring is biased to-
ward FDI or toward outsourcing depends on whether the easing of contractual frictions
disproportionately affects headquarters services or intermediate inputs. In contrast with
the transaction-costs literature, where any type of contractual improvement tends to
favour outsourcing, in this property-rights approach better contractibility of headquarter
services encourages outsourcing, while better contractibility of intermediate inputs en-
courages integration.
The property-rights approach from Grossman and Hart (1986) and adopted in Antràs
(2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004) suggests that in headquarter-intensive firms/industries
it is important that the final good producer be highly incentivised. This is done through verti-
cal integration, because final-good producers are able to appropriate higher fractions of rev-
enue under integration than under outsourcing. In contrast, in component-intensive industries,
it is important that the foreign supplier be highly incentivised, which is done by outsourcing.
This offers an explanation for the puzzling result in Antràs & Helpman (2008) that more con-
tractibility of the foreign supplier’s inputs will typically lead to less outsourcing. As the sup-
plier’s share of noncontractible inputs falls, the party that requires relatively more incentives
is the headquarters firm, which is achieved through vertical integration.
A firm faces a wider variety of possibilities between the two extremes of outsourcing and
internalisation that we have so far considered. There is not much research on these intermedi-
ate varieties, though. A firm may, for instance, engage in different types of joint ventures,
where this term denotes a situation in which “two or more entities have joint ownership of a
firm and none is in the position to exert unilateral control of the firm” (Barba Navaretti and
Venables, 2004, p. 300). A recent model of joint ventures (Rauch and Trindade, 2003) can
allow us to show a final market failure. The model analyses the matching of firms, i.e., the dif-
ficulty for a firm to find the most suitable local supplier to the specific component or activity
that the firm needs. The authors conclude that when the uncertainty about the right international
partner diminishes, joint ventures lead to a greater integration of international labour mar-
kets than autarky. Furthermore, the lower this uncertainty the more the outcome from their
model approaches the perfect capital mobility framework of the MacDougall’s (1960) one-sec-
tor economy. This is again a nascent research topic which seems of great interest.
3. Multinational firms and foreign direct investment in computable
general equilibrium models
3.1. Methodological issues
As mentioned earlier, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models allow combin-
ing a set of effects arising from the presence of MNEs in a unified framework to obtain
their overall impact. This approach offers not only the intuition on how the economy will
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well as on sectoral variables.
From a theoretical perspective, CGE techniques have been used to perform analyses
that do not rely on real data but on a range of simplified values for different variables of
the model –the so called “numerical CGE models”–. This is the approach followed in
Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000) and Markusen (1997; 2002, chapters 5 to 9), men-
tioned above, and, more recently, in Markusen et al. (2005). This latter methodology uses
sophisticated theories (synthesised in a generous number of equations) for which compu-
tational methods greatly facilitate solving the model and establishing interesting tax-
onomies in solutions for different levels of the variables (e.g., the interaction of factor en-
dowments and the size of the host and home countries, or different values for trade costs,
with the absence or existence of MNEs or of different types of MNEs). These models tend
to analyse real world problems for which data are difficult to be obtained by simplifying
the dataset assumed. The inclusion of real data in such a rich theoretical framework con-
stitutes a challenge for modellers.
The so called “empirical CGE models”, by contrast, are based on data from real
economies, which are embedded in a robust theoretical framework. As explained in Shoven
and Whalley (1984, 1992), neoclassical CGEs are based on the Arrow-Debreu general equi-
librium model, with some potential extensions. The interactions among economic agents are,
therefore, presented as a system of equations derived from microeconomic optimisation the-
ory. The models usually embody the behaviour of households, firms and the government of
the economy, whose microeconomic optimisation decisions are embedded in a framework
representing national accounts identities. In other words, the models also rest on the usual
progression of the circular flow of the economy: production, income distribution, and do-
mestic and foreign demand. Following that representation, they describe the equilibrium
conditions in goods and factor markets, as well as in the foreign sector.
CGE models share with the input-output methodology the fact of including intersec-
toral links in the analysis. Nevertheless, CGE models can use more flexible forms when
modelling these links as compared to the fixed coefficient structure of the input-output
framework. Thus, CGE is a methodology that allows dealing with many economic sectors
taking into account the linkages among them (Dawkins et al., 2001) and “assessing who
gains and who loses”, i.e., which sectors are better or worse off after a shock (Shoven and
Whalley, 1984, p. 1008). The treatment of intersectoral links seems very relevant when one
looks at the weight of intermediates in cost structures across sectors in the economy. If one
is to identify the effects of any shock, and in particular the impact of MNEs accruing to
different sectors in the economy, as well as the pattern of adjustments across sectors, con-
sidering intermediate links seems crucial.
The idea that equivalent FDI inflows may have very different impacts depending on
the sector to which they are directed has been stressed by some authors (Smarzynska,
2004; Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004, chapter 7). CGEs seem appropriate for the
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disaggregations in a quick and simple way for CGE modellers. Additionally, CGEs do
not only offer a great flexibility regarding the number of sectors, but also in the number
of households, factors of production and countries included in the analysis (Gómez-
Plana, 2005). It is notorious how Rutherford and Tarr (2008) have developed a model
with 55,098 households for which they derive the impact of welfare of Russia’s acces-
sion to the WTO.
Unlike an input-output analysis which concentrates mainly on the production side of the
economy, a general equilibrium framework takes also into account the demand side. Further,
CGE modelling allows the evaluation of consumers’ welfare, “one issue that is missing from
the discussion of effects of foreign direct investment (FDI), a strange omission from a liter-
ature dominated by economists (…)” (Lipsey, 2002, p. 60).
Due to its very nature, CGE models consider the interaction between goods and factor
markets. This seems relevant to assess the impact of any economic shock, and particularly
important in order to assess MNEs’ effects; as Markusen (2002) says: “(…) general-equilib-
rium interactions between goods and factor markets are key to interesting results”
(Markusen, 2002, p. 129); “(There are) general equilibrium factor-market effects that do not
arise in a partial equilibrium model” (Markusen, 2002, p. 91).
A CGE model further yields macroeconomic predictions stemming from its microeco-
nomic aggregation. It has been asserted that the potential of CGE models lies in their ability
to integrate micro and macro elements (Devarajan and Robinson, 2005). This means that
CGE models can measure the impact over the whole economy of a change in a particular
sector or in a particular variable (Scarf and Shoven, 1984), or of several changes or policy
measures taking place simultaneously (Devarajan and Robinson, 2005).
This comprehensive approach to the economy demands a model of considerable dimen-
sion (i.e. dozens of equations to be solved simultaneously). This is why it is necessary to use
a computable general equilibrium (Markusen, 2002).
Some critiques have been raised against CGE analysis, though. Kehoe (2005) has em-
phasised the poor performance of some of them in predicting the effects of NAFTA. How-
ever, NAFTA CGE models have received much better evaluations (Burfisher et al., 2001)
and, Kehoe, himself, has also recognised the good performance of other CGEs (Kehoe et al.,
1995). McKitrick (1998) and Jorgenson (1984) have raised the point of using adequate elas-
ticities and parameters. In particular, they suggest the recourse to econometric estimation in
order to obtain elasticities, rather than taking their values from estimations for different
countries and sectoral disaggregations. Hertel et al. (2007) offer a way to combine econo-
metric analysis with CGEs, and note how this methodology has been applied to one of the
most widely used database, namely, the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). GTAP
refers to a 57-sector 113-region 5-factor database of the world economy for general equilib-
rium simulations, developed at Purdue University, Indiana.
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For decades most applied trade models have not considered the presence of MNEs. This
absence seems to be, at least partly, due to data constraints on their activities. National sta-
tistics are still anchored in a system of “national” variables, in which there is no information
regarding which part of the variable is domestic and which is foreign, e.g., production by do-
mestic firms versus production by MNEs. Recently, the OECD has begun to collect data on
MNEs’ activities, but they are not still available for many countries and the series are rather
short (OECD, 2007). But also, at the theoretical level, it is probably fair to say that the in-
troduction of MNEs has posed an important challenge to trade models for a long time
(Markusen, 2002).
It is clear, however, that through its impact on employment, production, R&D and trade,
among others, even a small number of MNEs may exert an important influence on the eco-
nomic restructuring of countries and industries. For instance, MNEs are behind many trade
flows. According to UNCTAD (several years), one-third of the volume of world trade is ac-
counted by transactions in which MNEs are in one of the two sides of the exchange; and an-
other third of the volume of world trade is intrafirm trade. Accordingly, including MNEs in
the picture should improve, in a significant manner, our understanding of international trade
flows and of their subsequent effects. CGE models have not been an exception in ignoring
the presence of MNEs, however, in the last decade, a few of them have sought to derive their
effects. We review now the available contributions in this line.
Petri’s (1997) paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first CGE model incorporating
MNEs. He initialises a small number of papers mainly concerned with the effects of FDI lib-
eralisation (i.e., the lowering of barriers to FDI), which is a central element in most trading
agreements. The model is a 3-sector, 6-region perfect competition setting where FDI flows
are allocated endogenously responding to the fall in investment barriers. The paper has the
clear virtue of providing a framework in which regional agreements may be analysed. In par-
ticular, interesting results on the differential impact of different trade liberalisation policies
are obtained. His analysis is applied to the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) lib-
eralisation process. For the World as a whole, trade and FDI liberalisation in the APEC area,
produces a higher impact on welfare than restricting liberalisation to trade only (FDI liber-
alisation accounts for about one-third of the impact). At the regional level, however, FDI lib-
eralisation may exert a greater impact than trade liberalisation.
Following the pioneering work of Petri (1997), the “FDI and Trade Analysis Project”
(FTAP) model analyses the impact of liberalising FDI barriers in the services sectors in a 19-
region 3-sector setting. The model is explained in length in Hanslow et al. (1999). In a lat-
ter variant, Verikios and Zhang (2001a) introduce some more sectoral detail, by disaggregat-
ing the tertiary sector into six subsectors. Large-group monopolistic competition within a
Dixit-Stiglitz framework is assumed, but, as the authors claim, these features do not seem to
be important for their results. These features, however, imply symmetry across all type of
firms, which does not allow differentiating between MNEs and national firms’ technology.
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riers. Verikios and Zhang (2001b) concentrate on the impact of liberalisation in the telecom-
munications and financial services sectors in turn. FDI barriers are higher in this latter sec-
tor, thus, its liberalisation causes a greater reallocation of the world capital stock across
regions via FDI. Developed regions, which had lower levels of protection, lose capital which
accrues to developing regions. Both regions gain from liberalisation but developing ones
gain more. This final result also holds for the liberalisation in telecommunications but it does
not occur mainly via FDI allocations, but through different adjustments in the model. Inter-
estingly, unlike the typical effects of removing barriers to goods trade, regions with initial
higher services barriers (i.e. developing ones) experience the biggest increases in services
output as a result of liberalisation.
Brown and Stern (2001) extend the Michigan Model of world production and trade to
incorporate FDI and MNEs in a 18-region 3-sector framework. Their approach also relies on
Petri’s (1997) work but incorporates monopolistic competition following an earlier version
of Markusen et al. (2005). They again derive the effects from MNEs by simulating a fall in
barriers to FDI, while explaining in length the difficulties to evaluate their levels. The au-
thors introduce some less common variables in the analysis, such as a risk premium on the
rate of return of capital (which influences, probably, their contrasting result on this variable)
and a form of profit repatriation (fixed at the 10 per cent level). They emphasise that capital
flows are expected to have larger welfare impact than trade flows. For the economies receiv-
ing FDI flows, welfare, wages, the rate of return of capital, imports and exports will increase.
At the sectoral level, they obtain that capital inflows lead to an expansion of output which is
mainly generated by firms realising economies of scale.
Bchir et al. (2002) develop the MIRAGE model, which incorporates some interesting
features such as careful calculations of tariff data, imperfect competition à la Cournot and
dynamics. Regarding their treatment of FDI it should be stressed that they include FDI in a
framework in which MNEs are absent. This means that they model FDI as mere capital flows
crossing borders in response to different rates of return. Capital is the same no matter
whether it belongs to MNEs or national firms. Furthermore, all firms are symmetric and
there is no technological differentiation between MNEs and domestic firms. They simulate
the impact of trade liberalisation between the European Union and its periphery. The pres-
ence of FDI flows is a source of gains for the periphery. There is an increase in capital prof-
itability in that region, due to trade liberalisation, which attracts FDI flows. FDI inflows, in
turn, increase the capital stock and the number of firms (and product varieties) in the periph-
ery. This brings about an increase in wages of skilled and unskilled workers together with a
decrease in the rate of return to capital, which lead to an increase in GDP and, to a lesser ex-
tent, in welfare compared to the results in which FDI flows are absent (as they also run the
model without considering the presence of FDI flows).
Jensen et al. (2007) introduce FDI in order to analyse the impact of Russia’s accession
to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The authors analyse the differential effects of tar-
iff reform, improved market access, and reforms of FDI barriers in services sectors. They
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sia, accounting for 70 per cent of the overall gains. Their model assumes large-group mo-
nopolistic competition within a Dixit-Stiglitz framework in a 35-sector setting, which allows
them to impose symmetry. However, their symmetry assumption is within firm types, i.e., all
MNEs have identical cost structures, and all domestic firms that operate have cost structures
identical to other domestic firms. The key distinction lies in the fact that MNEs produce
using both domestic and imported inputs whereas domestic firms produce using only domes-
tic factors of production. This distinction is an important step forward in order to model
MNEs as a “peculiar” type of firm, which is different to a domestic firm.
The results of their simulations show that the fall in barriers to MNEs in Russia increases
their profitability in that region, leading to an increase in the number of MNEs operating
in Russia. Despite the reduction in domestic services varieties, due to the increased compe-
tition from MNEs, there would be a net increase in varieties; and, importantly, additional
services varieties reduce the cost of services in Russia, through a Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier effect.
Wages of both skilled and unskilled workers would increase. The authors estimate that lib-
eralisation of FDI barriers would increase Russian consumption by 5,2 per cent, which, as
mentioned above, constitutes approximately 70 per cent of the total gains.
An interesting variant of the model in Jensen et al.’s (2007) is Rutherford and Tarr
(2008), who abandon the assumption of a representative agent by introducing a large num-
ber of households (up to 55,098). They also analyse the impact for income distribution in
Russia, due to its accession to the WTO, showing that accession would be beneficial for 99.9
per cent of households.
All of the models above derive the impact of MNEs from a removal or reduction of
the barriers to FDI. However, an accurate estimation of these barriers is difficult to be ob-
tained, while being crucial to properly derive the effects of MNEs. Latorre et al. (2009)
extend the GTAP model (Hertel, 1997) to include MNEs. Interestingly, their model does
not rely on FDI barriers but on the assumption that the capital arriving with FDI flows will
increase the capital stock available for the production of MNEs. Furthermore, MNEs are
technologically differentiated from national firms, according to real data on their respec-
tive activities (OECD, 2007), so that MNEs are more capital intensive and rely more on
imported intermediates.
The model of Latorre et al. (2009) is flexible enough to incorporate publicly available
data on the activities of MNEs, unlike most of the models above, that rely to an important
extent on activities of particular research teams. This is a 20-sector model for the Czech Re-
public (that has received a large amount of FDI inflows since the beginning of transition) in
which the differential impact of the entry of MNEs in some selected manufacturing and ser-
vices sectors is simulated. In addition, the role of profit repatriation by MNEs, a nearly ne-
glected aspect in the literature is further explored. The results show that profit repatriation
seems to play a key role since, if above certain threshold levels, the positive effects of
MNEs’ entry on GDP and welfare might be partially or even totally offset.
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models seem to be a particularly suitable methodology for the study of regional trade agree-
ments and the role of FDI in this context. And, importantly, independently of whether they
are reported or not, most of the aggregate and sectoral variables are in fact consistently em-
bedded in the framework in which the results are obtained. Furthermore, the models shed
light on the quantitative magnitude of a particular shock, which may well offer valuable in-
formation for the policy maker in order to assess the relative importance of the phenomenon
analysed.
A challenge for this literature, in the light of the theoretical studies analysed earlier, is
the introduction of recent developments on within-industry heterogeneity, as well as “inter-
nalisation” issues. This, of course, is shared by other methodologies, as it still involves costly
demands in terms of data and complexity. A pioneering CGE model of trade including
firm heterogeneity following Mélitz (2003) is Zhai (2008), who does not include the role of
MNEs. In Zhai’s (2008) model, firm heterogeneity offers a theoretically well-grounded way
to capture variations in the extensive margin of trade flows. By contrast, the Armington as-
sumption, which does not capture this extensive margin, underestimates both trade and wel-
fare effects from trade liberalisation. Modeling heterogeneity, however, seems to involve
important challenges such as reducing the sensitivity of results to the parameter of the dis-
persion of firms’ productivity, the inclusion of firms’ entry and exit, or better characterisa-
tions of the different levels of fixed costs.
4. Concluding remarks
This article is an attempt to offer a comprehensive, up-to-date and “all-in-one”·review
of the main theoretical strands on FDI and MNEs, including insights from CGE models. The
earliest analyses, which appeared in the 1960s tended to model FDI as capital crossing bor-
ders in perfect competition settings. The work of Hymer drew attention to the idea that FDI
flows were better understood as the activity of a particular type of firm, the MNE, which
owned some sort of superior or special assets. The introduction of a different type of firm
broke the assumption of homogenous producers and goods and led to imperfect competition
as a framework for the analysis of MNEs. On the other hand, the need to transfer superior
assets across borders by MNEs introduced transaction costs in the analysis, which lies be-
hind the possibility of internalisation versus establishing contracts with independent suppli-
ers. The analysis of Hymer was given an important step further by Dunning’s OLI paradigm.
Later on, ownership and location advantages have been formalised in theoretical mod-
els of vertical and horizontal MNEs in the context of an industrial organisation approach.
Many earlier intuitions were translated into formal models. New and powerful computational
methods, have allowed theories to incorporate a great deal of relationships and specifica-
tions. This allows playing with simulations of different levels of factor endowments, size,
trade costs and types of MNEs, among others, to establish interesting taxonomies in solu-
tions. The “heterogeneous firms” literature has pushed further these efforts, by introducing
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(non-exporters, exporters and different types of MNEs). Heterogeneous firms models are
able to resemble the intra-industry reallocation of economic activity, as more productive
firms grow and less productive ones contract or exit. They also reflect that a MNE may un-
dertake a mixture of vertical and horizontal strategies, combining production of different
types of goods directed to, or stemming from, several origins and destination countries.
The most recent developments introduce heterogeneity into internalisation models of
FDI, in order to analyse a more complete picture of internationalisation strategies, including
outsourcing, which may well be shaping not only trade and FDI patterns but also economic
aggregates. As we have shown, the issue of internalisation conveys an important insight
which introduces its own influences on FDI and trade patterns, sometimes contradicting
those of more “technological” characterisations of MNEs. It seems that a complete theory of
MNEs would gain much by integrating the complementarities of both perspectives (i.e., con-
tractual and technological theories). The introduction of these recent breakthroughs also con-
stitutes a challenge for empirical methodologies.
Finally, in what means a novel feature of this article, we have reviewed the role of CGE
models in providing a comprehensive evaluation of the effects of any economic shock. Real
numbers are “plugged” in a robust theoretical framework which combines the interaction of:
i) all sectors in the economy, taking into account the important intermediates linkages among
them; ii) the demand and production side of the economy; iii) commodity and factor mar-
kets; iv) sectoral and aggregate variables; v) other different disaggregations across agents,
regions, and production factors.
The available CGE models that introduce MNEs tend to support the idea that the arrival
of this type of firms results in higher (both skilled and unskilled) average wage levels in the
host economy, as well as, increases in GDP, welfare and foreign trade. Some results, how-
ever, have shown that profit repatriation may counteract and, even if repatriation were above
a certain threshold, completely offset, the positive impact on GDP and welfare. It is the si-
multaneous interplay of all these forces which is important to get better approximations to
the real effects of MNEs. What is more, this approach offers not only the intuition on how
the economy adjusts but also quantitative evaluations of the impact of MNEs on both sec-
toral and aggregate variables, which may be of help for the policy maker when designing
FDI attraction policies.
Notes
1. A deeper analysis of the rich contributions of his book is available in Latorre (2004).
2. These models still assumed a “representative firm”, at least within each industry. Even MNEs had also the same
productivity and size as exporters, although their trade patterns could be different to those of exporters.
3. Two recent remarkable trade models along these lines, which do not include MNEs, are Bernard et al. (2007b)
and Helpman et al. (2007).
119 The economic analysis of multinationals and foreign direct investment: A review4. Following Coase’s (1937) and Williamson’s (1975, 1985) view, the need for contractual theories also holds for
a neoclassical theory of the firm, i.e., a theory based purely on technological considerations.
5. Our discussion uses the notation in Antràs and Helpman (2004). When a firm decides to keeps its operations,
e.g., the production of intermediate inputs, within its boundaries, this internalisation or integration or insourc-
ing may take place in the home country (vertical integration) or abroad (by which the firm becomes a MNEs
and engages in intrafirm trade). When a firm decides to outsource the production of an input, it may buy it at
home (domestic outsourcing) or abroad (arm’s length trade or foreign outsourcing). Offshoring denotes the
sourcing of inputs from foreign countries, both via arm’s-length trade (international outsourcing) and via in-
trafirm trade (vertical FDI).Note that if a firm outsources one activity it is not internalising that activity, and
that internalisation of activities undertaken abroad is necessary to become a MNE. However, it may be that a
MNE is so because it has some activities internalised abroad while it outsources others. Therefore, the rela-
tionship between outsourcing and MNEs cannot be taken for granted.
6. Their model offers a richer framework for the choice between integration and outsourcing than the one in
Grossman and Helpman (2002) who use a one-input general equilibrium framework without differences in
firms productivity.
7. The model keeps the features of Grossman and Hart (1986), by which final-good producers are able to appro-
priate higher fractions of revenue under integration than under outsourcing, with this fraction being higher
when integration takes place in the North than in the South.
8. Why is the reduction in foreign sourcing biased to arm’s length trade? On the one hand, in component-inten-
sive industries integration is rare according to these models. Thus, the fall in South wages and/or transport
costs favours outsourcing in the South over outsourcing in the North. On the other hand, for headquarter-in-
tensive industries, the sorting of fixed costs mentioned above, implies that among the integrated producers in
the North, the most productive are indifferent between integration in the North and outsourcing in the South.
Therefore, the fall in wages and transport costs favours foreign outsourcing over integration in the North.
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Resumen
Este artículo ofrece una síntesis completa y actualizada, así como una valoración de la literatura sobre
empresas multinacionales e inversión extranjera directa. A diferencia de la mayoría de las revisiones
previas de la literatura, combina distintas perspectivas mostrando sus discrepancias y complemen-
tariedades. Mediante una descripción cronológica, muestra las principales corrientes, desde los análi-
sis de competencia perfecta de los años sesenta, hasta contribuciones más recientes como el “knowl-
edge-capital model”, los modelos de empresas heterogéneas o los de internalización. El artículo ofrece
también una nueva perspectiva, al revisar los modelos de equilibrio general aplicado disponibles que
incluyen multinacionales e inversión extranjera directa.
Palabras clave: Empresas multinacionales, Inversión extranjera directa, Modelos de equilibrio general
aplicado.
Clasificación JEL: F21, F23, C68.
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